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THE FUTURE AND PAST OF  
U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
MARTIN S. FLAHERTY* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Well before Iraq, the United States had carved for itself a reputation of a global 
power that tried not to concern itself with the rest of the globe, even, or perhaps espe-
cially, when it sent its armed forces abroad.  The nation’s recent experience in Iraq 
casts this paradox in still higher relief.  As the war shows, the United States has never 
occupied a more commanding international position, nor a greater readiness to assert 
itself.  Epithets such as “sole superpower,” “hegemon,” and “empire” now commonly 
describe the once isolated republic, whose first president warned of foreign entangle-
ments.  By contrast, the aftermath of the war suggests that, for better or worse, Ameri-
cans make lousy imperialists thanks to our aversion to longstanding foreign commit-
ments; and pretty much only for worse, remain inward-looking and ignorant of the 
societies that we so profoundly affect.1 
Law imitates life overseas as well as at home.  The increasing role that the United 
States plays in the world can only mean a correspondingly greater role for foreign af-
fairs law in the U.S. legal community.  As if on cue, the Supreme Court has recently 
cited international and comparative law materials to a striking, and all but unprece-
dented, degree.  One result of the growing importance of foreign affairs law will be 
the renewed focus on who can legitimately make foreign policy: Congress, the Presi-
dent, or even the states.  Most compelling here is the perennial issue of the war power, 
which happened not to surface with regard to the Iraq war, but which might, sooner or 
later, emerge in connection with a continued U.S. military presence.  Another result of 
U.S. engagement will be the consideration of how international law—treaties, execu-
tive agreements, transnational authorities—applies domestically.  Slowly and not en-
tirely surely the U.S. has determined that it cannot avoid becoming an international 
citizen.  The pressures and opportunities of globalization make participation in multi-
lateral regimes such as NAFTA, the IMF, the WTO, not to mention the U.N. Commis-
sion on Human Rights, the U.N. Human Rights Committee, and the United Nations 
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 1. For recent expositions of this theme, see MICHAEL HIRSH, AT WAR WITH OURSELVES (2003) (arguing 
that in order for the United States to perpetuate the global system it has built, it must rely on the international 
community); CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, ROGUE NATION: AMERICAN UNILATERALISM AND THE FAILURE OF GOOD 
INTENTIONS (2003)  (exploring foreign policy ramifications of U.S. unilateralism). 
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itself harder to avoid.  Concurrently, therefore, there will be an increased focus on 
U.S. foreign affairs law at future conferences on constitutional law.2 
Just as U.S. foreign policy ventures abroad while looking inward, so too does U.S. 
foreign affairs law.  Not long ago a group of young, original, and energetic scholars 
set out to question many of the internationalist premises in constitutional law that have 
prevailed in the field at least since World War II.3  One prominent scholar sympathetic 
to the overall trend heralded this development as the potential genesis of a “new 
American foreign affairs law.”4  Critics have been less charitable, offering terms such 
as “new sovereigntists.”5  As these labels imply, one hallmark of the new foreign af-
fairs law has been an effort to revive limitations on the ability of federal institutions to 
make international commitments, or recognize international standards, that would 
have binding domestic effects, especially in the face of claims on behalf of states’ 
rights.  This revival of state-oriented federalism has proceeded hand-in-hand with a 
resurgence of executive-oriented separation of powers advocacy.6  Though less obvi-
ously inward looking—the standard assumption has long been that presidents are 
more interventionist than the other branches—the impetus for this trend stems more 
from assumptions about the role of the executive in the U.S. constitutional order than 
from any assumptions about the president’s likely performance in foreign affairs. 
To a remarkable degree, recent foreign affairs scholarship has not merely looked 
inward, but backward.  Perhaps even more so than domestic constitutional law, its 
conclusions rest upon originalism outright or draw heavily upon ostensible under-
standings at the time of the Founding.7  Taken together, the historical claims tell a mu-
tually reinforcing story of continuity and consensus.  Eighteenth-century Americans, 
following their eighteenth-century British counterparts, were generally skeptical of 
foreign commitments unless authorized by normal democratic process.8  On this basis 
John Yoo, for example, argues that originalism compels the conclusion that treaties, 
above all international human rights treaties, are not to be presumed self-executing.9  
Likewise, eighteenth-century Anglophones remained united in believing that the con-
duct of foreign affairs was inherently executive and held fast to this view.  From this 
 
 2. To the extent that globalization obtains, the U.S. legal community will also continue to confront the 
need to study international law itself.  See Martin S. Flaherty, Aim Globally, 17 CONST. COMMENTARY 205, 
214-16 (2000) (discussing U.S. courts ruling on international customs). 
 3. The classic expression of this postwar orthodoxy remains LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996).  See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack N. Goldsmith, Customary International Law 
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 843-45 (1997) (summa-
rizing Henkin’s argument that customary international law resembles federal law for the purpose of the last-in-
time rule).  As the American Law Institute’s Chief Reporter, Henkin earned further recognition for this princi-
ple in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §1 reporters’ 
notes 1, 4 (1987). 
 4. Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089 passim (1999). 
 5. Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets, FOREIGN 
AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 9-10. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 67-78. 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 80-96. 
 8. John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Under-
standing, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2024-25 (1999) 
 9. See id. at 1969 (explaining the Marshall Court rejection of the idea that all treaties should be self-
executing in Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829)). 
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premise Professors Prakash and Ramsay conclude that all foreign affairs authority 
falls to the President by default, unless otherwise specified in the text of the Constitu-
tion.10  In good originalist fashion, it follows that any departure from the clear and 
considered foreign affairs thinking that prevailed from the colonial era through the 
early years of the Republic must be presumptively invalid. 
But doctrinal claims, to the extent they rely on history, can prevail if they are his-
torically credible.11  Happily, a number of prominent challenges have been issued, 
questioning specific historical claims made by the new foreign affairs movement.12  
But no one has yet noted the common themes that the revisionist history puts forward 
nor the common flaws that undermine much of revisionist foreign affairs law.  As 
with domestic originalism, the story of continuity and consensus offers an immediate 
source of doubt.  The past is notoriously messy, because a contentious area, such as 
the proper ordering of government, is usually replete with conflicting voices, espe-
cially during an era of rebellion, revolution, and innovation.  More concretely, revis-
ing the revisionist account gives rise to an alternative story.  This story, first of all, 
gives the lie to any notion that constitutional thinkers of the Founding had early on 
worked out well-settled solutions to foreign affairs issues that have since vexed their 
modern descendants.  Still less does the evidence suggest that any dominant pattern 
that did emerge settled on either an executive brand of separation of power or a local-
ist version of federalism.  To the extent a close examination does reveal trends, it is an 
embrace of internationalism and ambiguity with regard to which branch, if any, would 
control foreign policy—positions both borne of new lessons learned amid the rapidly 
changing circumstances and ideas that independence initiated.  As this last point sug-
gests, the early constitutional history of foreign affairs indicates how little the Found-
ing generation actually established, rather than how much. 
Better foreign relations history points to a better approach to foreign relations law.  
Of course it is an open question why the views of the Founders who, however experi-
enced and prescient otherwise, remained neophytes in global affairs at a time when the 
United States was globally marginal, should be binding upon modern constitutional 
actors.  As Ronald Dworkin has pointed out, the question of the weight accorded his-
tory in constitutional theory should in the end be resolved by theory.13  But to the ex-
tent history matters—and most theories posit that the past carries some weight—a 
more complete account of early foreign affairs points in a direction that even skeptics 
of originalism might find congenial.  Precisely because the Founding generation had 
resolved so little, rather than so much, in their new Constitution, it quickly became 
apparent that many key constitutional issues in foreign affairs would have to be 
worked out over time by the three branches in light of the likely consequences.  While 
leading historians have pointed out that this result also frequently obtains in domestic 
 
 10. Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE 
L.J.  231 (2001).
 
 11. Martin S. Flaherty, Article and Responses: History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995). 
 12. David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Con-
ception of  the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000). 
 13. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33, 53-55 (1985). 
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constitutional issues,14 in foreign affairs it is close to systemic.  In foreign affairs, the 
Founding paradoxically bolsters nothing as much as the method espoused by Justice 
Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,15 often seen among the most anti-
originalist opinions in the modern canon.  Whereas Jackson merely assumed history 
was invariably inconclusive, here a careful reconstruction of the Founding era deci-
sions tends to confirm the assumption.  In consequence, ongoing tradition and custom 
step in to determine the constitutional meaning.  This is not to say, with Jackson, that 
the Founding generation never settled upon certain understandings.  When it did, 
however, more often than not the conclusion cuts against the revisionist story, espe-
cially with regard to localism.16 
All this leaves the historical foundations of the new foreign affairs law movement 
on doubly shaky ground.  First, the specific agreements established by the Founding 
generation were more often than not either internationalist, as in the doctrine of self-
executing treaties, or non-presidentialist, as in conferring the War Power upon Con-
gress.  More systemically, the Founding generation simply left unresolved many cen-
tral foreign affairs questions, such as whether the President and Senate or the Presi-
dent alone may terminate treaties, thus leaving such matters to be resolved through 
custom.  For these reasons, modern foreign affairs claims that rely on the myth of con-
sensus and continuity should at least face the twofold presumption that they must re-
but.  In contrast, foreign affairs history—perhaps more so than in any other area of 
constitutional law—points beyond itself, leaving it to subsequent generations to prag-
matically determine constitutional arrangements in foreign affairs by considering their 
likely results.  This forward and outward-looking project might be daunting.  But, if 
only on historical grounds, it beats reliance on myth. 
This article seeks to clear the way for just such an approach.  Part II explores in 
greater detail the growing prominence of foreign affairs issues in constitutional law 
and surprisingly atavistic solutions that have been proffered in response.  Part III turns 
to the historical case on which many of these new foreign affairs solutions are built 
and exposes these as fundamentally inconsistent with the general scholarly narrative 
of the era as well as with the specific historical sources bearing upon foreign affairs.  
The underbrush cleared, Part IV then describes Justice Jackson’s reliance on constitu-
tional custom in Youngstown as the counterintuitive guided by the history of foreign 
affairs law. 
 
 14. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
159-60 (1996). 
 15. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (stat-
ing that historical authorities are often ambiguous). 
 16. See Martin S. Flaherty, More Apparent Than Real: The Revolutionary Commitment to Constitutional 
Federalism, 45 KANSAS L. REV. 993, 1009-11 (1997). 
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II 
COSMOPOLITANS AT THE GATES 
A. Global Legal Reality 
As Anne-Marie Slaughter has pointed out, “judicial globalization” marches on in 
almost the same inexorable fashion as its economic cousin.17  This observation holds 
true in particular regarding judges of one nation making reference to the analogous 
laws of another, as well as judges of any nation citing relevant international law.  So 
powerful has the tide become that it has recently swept up several justices—and even 
an occasional majority—of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
This past term provides the latest cases in point.  With regard to international law, 
easily one of the most important decisions handed down was Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain.18  Despite an excess of cautionary rhetoric, the Court in essence upheld 
modern litigation under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), through which aliens have 
brought tort suits in federal court for human rights violations under customary interna-
tional law.19  In so doing, the Sosa majority guaranteed that the federal judiciary’s 
duty to engage with international legal standards in ATS suits would continue. 
Less noted, but perhaps even more significant, was the Court’s rejection of Justice 
Scalia’s contention that Erie v. Tompkins20 in effect deprived the Federal courts of the 
power to recognize international norms absent further congressional action.  To the 
contrary, Justice Souter’s majority opinion indicates that the Court stands by its tradi-
tional understanding, as conventionally understood in such cases as The Pacqute Ha-
bana,21 that customary international law was part of the domestic law of the United 
States.  While this confirmation came in the specific context of considering whether 
federal judges could identify evolving international norms under the ATS, its import is 
to confirm that international custom was part of judicially enforceable federal law 
even in the absence of a statute.22 
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, likewise displayed an internationalist 
bent in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, in which an American citizen seized in Afghanistan and 
held incommunicado in the United States as an “enemy combatant” sought habeas re-
lief from the federal courts.23  Here Justice Souter came closer to the core of judicial 
globalization in looking to international law to resolve a domestic legal issue.  Spe-
cifically, the Justice considered the government’s contention that the Congressional 
resolution authorizing military action against al-Qaida and the Taliban authorizes the 
President, as Commander-in-Chief, to detain enemy belligerents according to the in-
ternational laws of war.  Accordingly, the argument continued, the Resolution author-
 
 17. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). 
 18. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). 
 19. Id. at 2754-67. 
 20. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 21. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
 22. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2764-65 & n.19. 
 23. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
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ized detention consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), which prohibits detention of citi-
zens except pursuant to an act of Congress.  Souter (and Ginsburg) rejected this argu-
ment on the grounds that the laws of war as codified in the Third Geneva Convention 
appeared to require that Hamdi be treated as a prisoner of war, or at least receive a 
hearing to determine that he is an unlawful combatant.  The opinion, in short, con-
cluded that Congress could not have authorized Hamdi’s detention as consistent with 
the laws of war on the assumption that the government was violating exactly those 
laws.24 
If anything, the previous term was even more significant.  In the widely antici-
pated University of Michigan affirmative action cases, a 5-4 majority in Grutter v. 
Bollinger held that “the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the [University of 
Michigan] Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to fur-
ther a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a di-
verse student body,”25 even while the court struck down the more “mechanical” race-
conscious scheme in undergraduate admissions in Gratz v. Bollinger.26  Likewise an-
ticipated, but far more surprising, another one-vote majority in Lawrence v. Texas27 
overruled Bowers v. Hardwick28 to hold that a state statute criminalizing homosexual 
sodomy was inconsistent with substantive due process. 
For all the obvious domestic importance of these rulings, their embrace of interna-
tional law may prove to be more compelling in the long run.  In Grutter, for example, 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, filed a concurring opinion that commences 
with citations to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination (CERD)29 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).30  The concurrence brings in these stan-
dards to argue that although the majority opinion that affirmative action programs 
must have an end point “accords with the international understanding,” the United 
States has not yet gotten there.31 
Even more striking was Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence, which 
stressed that Western standards regarding the regulation of homosexual conduct had 
for all intents and purposes made Bowers an anomaly in most of the industrialized 
world.32  For this proposition, Lawrence relied on a string of decisions issued by the 
European Court of Human Rights, as well as a brief submitted by former Irish Presi-
dent and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson, who had liti-
 
 24. Id. at  2652, 2657-60 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 25. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
 26. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 280 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 27. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003). 
 28. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 29. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Annex to G.A. Res. 2106, U.N. 
GAOR, 20th Sess., Annex, Art. 2(2), U.N. Doc. A/6014, (1965)). 
 30. Id. (quoting G.A. Res. 180, 34th Sess., U.N. GAOR, Annex, Art. 4(1), U.N. Doc. A/34/46, (1979)). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 572-79. 
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gated several of these cases while still a law school professor.33  These references, 
moreover, follow on the previous term’s Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court like-
wise referenced international standards in holding that the execution of the mentally 
retarded violated the Eighth Amendment.34 
What makes these references striking is not their content but that they were in-
cluded at all, especially in such high profile, ostensibly domestic cases.  With certain 
exceptions—such as Justice Breyer35 and Justice Stevens36—the Justices of the Su-
preme Court of the United States are notorious for their aversion to referring to legal 
developments abroad unless absolutely necessary.  This aversion has long stood in 
ironic contrast to courts around the world that regularly examine both international 
and comparative law, including the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court.37  When 
the Court has turned to foreign materials in major cases, it has usually been in areas of 
law where U.S. sources had yet to exist, as in Justice Blackmun’s account of the Per-
sian Empire in Roe v. Wade38 or Chief Justice Burger’s musings on the “Judeo-
Christian” heritage in Bowers itself.39  By contrast, the decisions of the past term stand 
out precisely because they go out of their way to consider contemporary international 
standards—in particular, international human rights law—in dealing with fundamental 
domestic issues. 
Evidence of the Court’s creeping internationalism did not end there.  Of more sub-
tle significance are cases such as American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi.40  Gara-
mendi involved an international device determining internal law as the Court for the 
first time held that a foreign policy commitment staked out by the President and re-
flected in an executive agreement with another nation preempts inconsistent state 
law.41  Despite the novel extension of preemption doctrine, the Court’s reliance on an 
international instrument to which the United States is a party—as opposed to decrees 
of human rights tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the United States—is entirely 
conventional.  Rather, Garamendi’s significance is as an example of the growing 
scope of international agreements that the United States and other nations will increas-
ingly forge.  In this particular instance, the U.S. and Germany entered into an agree-
ment to resolve the outstanding insurance claims of Holocaust survivors with a novel 
settlement fund, implicitly in lieu of domestic tort litigation.42 
 
 33. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77.  But see id. at 539 U.S. 586-605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning the 
relevance of this source). 
 34. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (referring to an international norm against exe-
cution of the mentally retarded). 
 35. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-78 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referring to the 
European Union). 
36. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990-91 (1999). 
 37. See Flaherty, supra note 2, at 205-07 (providing examples of foreign courts relying on U.S. jurispru-
dence); see also Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State Sover-
eignty, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1027, 1067 (2002) (describing I.C.J.’s reliance on U.S. Supreme Court precedent in 
resolving a water-rights case in sub-Saharan Africa). 
 38. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130 (1973). 
 39. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, J., concurring). 
 40. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 41. Id. at 421-23. 
 42. Id. at 464-65. 
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Most of all, however, Garamendi dealt with both the domestic applicability of an 
international commitment, and who within the nation gets to make such commit-
ments.43  Here, the Court clearly opted against the states, striking down California’s 
statute mandating that insurance companies disclose information which might facili-
tate further suits.44  Conversely, the Court declined to reaffirm the controversial 
Zschernig v. Miller,45 which announced a “dormant foreign affairs power” doctrine 
that precludes state action even when the federal government is silent.46  With regard 
to the federal government itself, Garamendi gave a fairly broad account of what 
counts as preemptively binding exercises of presidential authority in foreign affairs.47  
Not only does a formal executive agreement count, but so too apparently do state-
ments informally made by executive officials before and after negotiations.48  Also 
expressly left unaddressed is the exact relationship between this broad vision of bind-
ing presidential foreign affairs policy and Acts of Congress regulating the same for-
eign affairs matters. 
It would not go too far to argue that these cases represent a breakthrough for the 
U.S. judiciary belatedly participating in the “internationalization of the law.”49  The 
legal result of globalization is by definition so vast that it requires separate treatment.50  
Suffice it to say that for several reasons the need for the U.S. legal system to develop a 
more integrated and comprehensive relationship with outside legal frameworks will 
almost surely be among the principal legal stories of the new century.51 
One set of reasons for this trend hearkens back to the position of the United States 
as the current global “superpower,” “empire,” or “hegemon.”  However much the ter-
rorist attacks on September 11 may have been the provocation, we have witnessed a 
President—one who had barely traveled abroad and who displayed an early penchant 
for treating the rest of the world as if it did not exist—lead the nation in successive 
wars, regime-changes, and attempts at nation-building.  These activities, moreover, 
may be seen as highly dramatic supplements to ongoing U.S. intervention in the for-
mation and maintenance of international law and legal institutions.  Examples of this 
intervention include the drafting of NAFTA and the Convention for the International 
Sale of Goods and, perhaps ironically, run back at least to U.S. influence in the crea-
tion of such international standards as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.  
Even actions such as the cutting off of military aid to nations that participate in the 
new International Criminal Court represent a self-conscious acknowledgment, how-
 
 43. Id. at 412-13. 
 44. Id. at 429. 
 45. Id. at 417-20. 
 46. See generally Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
 47. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413-16, 421-23 (2003). 
 48. See id. at 420-22. 
 49. Charlotte Ku & Christopher J. Borgen, American Lawyers and International Competence, 18 DICK. J. 
INT’L L. 493, 505-11 (2000). 
 50. For an original treatment on the judicial aspect of the process, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial 
Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103 (2000). 
 51. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Address: The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law 
Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1988) (describing the process of integrating international legal norms into U.S. 
law). 
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ever isolationist, that continuing U.S. participation abroad will run up against interna-
tional precepts. 
A second set of reasons for further U.S. engagement with legal internationaliza-
tion has to do with the growth of the international precepts that the United States will 
increasingly encounter.  More and more public international law covers not just rela-
tions between sovereign nation states, but also transnational organizations; and, espe-
cially through international human rights law, individuals as well.  Likewise, interna-
tional norms also increasingly arise not just from treaties, but from pronouncements of 
a growing number of transnational and regional bodies such as International Center 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee, and 
the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights.  Add to this what Harold 
Koh terms the increasing “internalization” of international law within other domestic 
legal systems, and the pressure on a globally dominant United States to more coher-
ently grapple with global norms becomes ever more substantial.52 
The Supreme Court’s recent case law shows this process to be underway along at 
least a couple of axes.  However much a departure, Lawrence and Grutter illustrate 
how international standards may influence domestic U.S. law directly.  In each in-
stance, the relevant opinions did what courts from other jurisdictions have commonly 
done in referring to U.S. decisions—apply developments from beyond the borders to 
define fundamental rights.  How the opinions did this remains unclear.  Justices Ken-
nedy and Ginsburg were probably looking abroad merely for comparative purposes.  
The norms they cited, however, could also be viewed as directly binding: for Kennedy 
on the theory that tradition for substantive due process is not merely American, for 
Ginsburg on the grounds that the United States ratified the relevant treaties. 
Other applications of international law also percolate.  The vigor of customary in-
ternational law will receive renewed attention in the ATS that follow Sosa, not least 
actions such as UNOCAL, in which aliens have sued major U.S. corporations for hu-
man rights violations.53  Likewise, the Court will soon revisit the issue of the juvenile 
death penalty, and with it, the debate over whether international and foreign standards 
are relevant to the concept of evolving standards under the Eighth Amendment.54  
When, sooner or later, the United States ratifies a human rights treaty that lacks a res-
ervation relevant to a potential U.S. violation, expect renewed discussion, already evi-
dent in scholarship, focusing on the ostensibly settled doctrine that treaties are self-
executing in domestic law.  Not necessarily least, and certainly not last, U.S. Reports 
will almost surely feature straightforward comparative analysis beyond rights, along 
the lines of Justice Breyer demonstrating how the federalism of the European Union 
did not preclude the higher sovereign commandeering the executive officers of the 
constituent units.55 
 
 52. Id. at 641-63. 
 53. John Doe I v. UNOCAL Corp. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 54. See Roper v. Simmons, 124 S. Ct. 1171 (2004) (granting certiorari to the Supreme Court of Missouri 
regarding a case involving a 17-year-old defendant sentenced to death after being found guilty of murder). 
 55. Printz, 521 U.S. at 976-78 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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The recent Supreme Court jurisprudence deals also with the no less intricate prob-
lem of who within the United States may make official foreign policy commitments.  
As Garamendi suggests, even large issues that pertain to the federalism aspect of this 
question remain surprisingly ambiguous.56  The decision itself, Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trades Council, declined to reaffirm the dormant foreign affairs power, in-
stead relying on specific expressions of federal policy.57  When, if ever, state foreign 
policy initiatives will be struck down in the absence of a federal policy remains un-
clear.  Yet, thanks to Garamendi, likewise unclear is what will count as an expression 
of at least presidential foreign policy.58  Beyond all this, certain scholars seek to ob-
fuscate the doctrine of Missouri Holland, which states that Congress may legislate un-
der the Treaty Power what it may not be able to do under a domestic power grant, 
such as the Commerce Clause.  Here the argument runs that at least some of the states 
rights protections the Court has enunciated domestically should obtain against treaties 
as well as statutes.59  What makes these and related questions all the more intriguing is 
that, unlike many areas of domestic policy, in foreign affairs states and localities often 
appear in a progressive guise ahead of the federal government on key issues such as 
human rights.60 
But for all the interesting twists provided by federalism, the principal foreign af-
fairs action will likely remain regarding the separation of powers at the federal level.  
Post Garamendi, what courts should do if presidential spokespeople tell the states to 
stay away from foreign policy initiatives that Congress might tacitly approve of is as 
unclear as the situation is increasingly likely to occur.61  Also, in both regards, are 
such perennial issues as whether the president may unilaterally terminate a treaty or, 
for that matter, get us into a war. 
B. Sovereign Fictions 
A still relatively new group of iconoclasts offers a range of provocative answers to 
these, and related, foreign affairs questions.  Loosely grouped under the “new foreign 
affairs law” banner, these scholars and sometimes government officials stand united in 
challenging what they deem to be the foreign affairs law “orthodoxy” that has pre-
vailed at least since the end of the Second World War.62  Set out most comprehen-
 
 56. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 412-18 (2003). 
 57. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8 (2000). 
 58. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 423 n.13. 
 59. Compare Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 
(1998) and Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98 
(2000) (arguing for federalism limit in Congressional treaty implementation) with Golove, supra note 12 (op-
posing federalism limitations in this context). 
 60. See Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human 
Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245 (2001) (noting the allocation of authority between fed-
eral and sub-federal systems in the implementation of the international human rights law); Peter J. Spiro, The 
States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567 (1997) (describing the significance of sub-
national responsibility as it applies to international human rights). 
 61. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 428-29. 
 62. See Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law? 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089 (1999). 
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sively in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,63 
this orthodoxy remains above all internationalist by generally approving of doctrines 
that facilitate U.S. participation in, and adherence to, the international legal order.  
Less obviously, this dominant foreign affairs school takes balanced positions on rele-
vant separation of powers issues, in particular rejecting the idea that the President en-
joys the default position of power in any grey area.64  By contrast, the new foreign af-
fairs pretenders stress U.S. sovereignty and related constitutional barriers to limit U.S. 
legal commitments abroad.65  Less routinely, a number of advocates within the move-
ment argue for a broad, indeed hegemonic role in foreign affairs for the President.66 
Many commentators have already decried or applauded this would-be foreign af-
fairs law reformation, but almost no one has accounted for its sudden emergence.  As 
Peter Spiro has noted, a certain “brand of anti-internationalism runs deep in the 
American political tradition.”67  However much this tradition ebbed and flowed be-
forehand, it seems clear that it receded for a sustained period in light of World War II, 
the Cold War, and the consensus for U.S. international engagement that the two con-
flicts fostered.  It should therefore have come as no surprise that the end of the Cold 
War would have eroded that consensus and the dominant legal vision that sprang from 
it.  From the perspective of its defenders, the new foreign affairs school usefully chal-
lenges untested assumptions, especially those willing to overlook the ostensible lack 
of democratic participation in U.S. involvement in international legal structures.  To 
its critics, the challengers merely serve up Federalist Society dogma, taking it one 
level further on the international plane, mainly on the supposition that keeping things 
local, rather than international, and presidential, rather than congressional and judicial, 
will serve a particular political agenda.  Ironically, the post-September 11 war on ter-
rorism might have a similar effect, undermining some aspects of the new foreign af-
fairs movement as it is getting started.  Then again, some ideas, once advocated, can 
take on lives of their own. 
International skepticism cascades across several doctrines, none more so than 
those dealing with the applicability of international law domestically.68  Here foreign 
affairs law revisionists would deny the doctrine, established at least since the Supreme 
Court’s decision in The Paquete Habana,69 that the judiciary can apply customary in-
ternational law as a type of federal law.70  The same school likewise rejects the more 
 
 63. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, THIRD, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987). 
 64. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 83-130 (2nd ed. 1996). 
 65. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 1100-02. 
 66. See, e.g., Prakash & Ramsay, supra note 10. 
 67. Spiro, supra note 5, at 9. 
 68. See Bradley, supra note 4 (noting the recently diminished role of the judiciary in foreign affairs law).  
One further indication of localist-oriented ferment in foreign affairs law appears in CURTIS A. BRADLEY & 
JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2003).  In contrast to previous case-
books, this work considers various types of federalism constraints in foreign affairs evident in scholarship, and 
in certain lower court opinions.  See id. at 275-337, 373-85. 
 69. The Paquete Habana., 175 U.S. 677 (1900).  The prevailing interpretation of the case is set out in the 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, THIRD, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §111 (1987). 
 70. E.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, supra note 3; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998); A. M. Weisburd, 
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recent understanding, set out in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala,71 that Congress has imple-
mented customary international standards through the Alien Tort Statute,72 and even 
that it has the power to do so.73  Also slated for demolition is the rule, set out in Mis-
souri v. Holland,74 that Congress possesses legislative power to implement treaties it 
otherwise might not enjoy under domestic grants of power that leave certain areas of 
regulation to the states.75  Out of similar federalism concerns, the Supreme Court’s 
greater readiness to find statutory preemption in a statute dealing with foreign affairs 
cannot survive.76  It follows that Zschernig’s enunciation of a dormant foreign affairs 
authority that can preempt state laws even in the absence of a federal statute, treaty, or 
executive agreement must also go.77  And at least one new foreign affairs law enthusi-
ast has suggested that, contrary to the ostensibly plain text of the Supremacy Clause, 
treaties that the United States has ratified should not be presumptively treated as the 
supreme law of the land but instead must be implemented by Congress in order to 
have domestic effect.78 
While the major key of foreign affairs revisionism has been concern for sover-
eignty, an emerging minor key is presidential primacy.  This position has its own 
longstanding history, running through Justice Sutherland’s much maligned opinion in 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright79 to more venerable assertions by Alexander Hamil-
 
State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L. L. 1 (1995).  For rejoinders, see, for 
example, Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal 
Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: 
A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law 
of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law after Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997).  For 
earlier statements articulating the internationalist position, see Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and 
the Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295 (1994); Louis Henkin, International Law 
as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (1984). 
 71. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 72. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587 (2002) (arguing 
that the Alien Tort Statute was intended to implement Article III alienage jurisdiction).  But see Beth Stephens, 
Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to “Define and Punish . . . offenses against the Law of Na-
tions”, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447 (2000) (defending the conventional view that the Alien Tort Statute im-
plements customary international law as analogous to federal common law). 
 73. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 873. 
 74. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 75. See, e.g., Bradley, Treaty Power I, supra note 59; Bradley, Treaty Power II, supra note 59.  For a vig-
orous defense of broad national foreign affairs power, see Golove, supra note 12.  See also, Gerald L. Neuman, 
The Global Dimensions of RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 33 (1977) (arguing that Congress could enact the Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as ratified by 
the United States). 
 76. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (holding that the state’s power to legislate in the area of for-
eign relations was subordinate to the federal government’s power to do so).  For one challenge to this presump-
tion, see Jack L. Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175 (2000).  For a de-
fense, see  Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the “One-Voice” Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 
975, 1013 (2001). 
 77. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
 78. Yoo, supra note 9.  But see Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Un-
derstanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999) (re-affirming tradi-
tional understanding of Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829), that treaties are presumed to be self-executing); 
Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999) (relying on constitutional text, 
doctrine and structure to rule out Professor Yoo’s claim that treaties are not presumed self-executing). 
 79. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
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ton.80  In contrast to the localist tradition, engagement in foreign affairs imperatives 
such as the Cold War tends to weigh in favor of the presidentialist position.  Amidst a 
backdrop of international engagement, the White House and Congress each marshaled 
support that ebbed and flowed between legislative claims such as the War Powers 
Resolution81 and executive assertions like the unilateral termination of the Panama 
Canal Treaty.82  Revisionists who seek a logical connection between foreign affairs 
localism and presidentialism might find common ground in the concept of democratic 
accountability.  Like national and state governments relative to international bureauc-
racies, relative to the President, Congress or the courts more accurately reflects popu-
lar will.  Skeptics might add that both positions dovetail more with the views associ-
ated with the current White House. 
Presidential foreign affairs revisionism has yet to claim the same doctrinal turf as 
the sovereigntist branch.83  At least one revisionist argument, however, seeks to revive 
the sweeping claim that the so-called “Vesting Clause” of Article II84 implicitly grants 
the President substantial residual powers not specified in the remainder of that Article.  
Alexander Hamilton famously, though diffidently, raised this argument in his first 
Pacificus essay defending President Washington’s 1793 neutrality proclamation.85  Its 
fortunes have risen and fallen ever since.  Domestically, the Supreme Court most 
nearly embraced the idea in Myers v. United States,86 though this stance has since been 
greatly qualified.87  Perhaps not coincidentally, among the Court’s more notable repu-
 
 80. See Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus Nos. 1-7 (1793) reprinted in 15 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 33-135 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1969). 
 81. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2000). 
 82. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).  Not to be forgotten is the judiciary’s own assertions, or lack 
thereof, in foreign affairs.  In Goldwater, for example, the Court declined to referee a dispute between the po-
litical branches on justiciability grounds.  Id. at 997. 
 83. One area in which the two ideas come together is John Yoo’s claim that the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention violates the Appointment’s Clause in mandating the appointment of executive officers by international 
bodies rather than by the Executive Branch.  John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The 
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 87 (1998). 
 84. This clause provides that “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America.”  U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 1.
 
 85. See 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33-43 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 
1969).
 
 86. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 132-41 (1926).  The claim takes up only one paragraph of the 
Court’s lengthy opinion.  Much of the Court’s opinion is focused instead on a 1789 debate in the House of Rep-
resentatives over the President’s removal power.  Id. at 111-18, 119-39, 174-75. 
 87. In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), the Court upheld a statute restricting 
the power of the President to remove a Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission.  The Court in Hum-
phrey’s Executor noted that the only point actually decided in Myers was that “the President had power to re-
move a postmaster of the first class, without the advice and consent of the Senate as required by act of Con-
gress.”  Id. at 626.  The Court also stated that it was disapproving of any statements in Myers that were “out of 
harmony with the views here set forth.”  Id.  The decision in Myers was further qualified in Morrison v. Olson, 
487 U.S. 654 (1988), in which the Court held that Congress could impose a “good cause” limitation on the 
President’s power to remove an independent counsel.  Id. at 686-89.  In his lone dissent, Justice Scalia invoked 
the Vesting Clause Thesis.  Id. at 705-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In response, the majority stated in a footnote 
that Justice Scalia’s Vesting Clause argument for an absolute power of removal “depends upon an extrapolation 
from general constitutional language which we think is more than the text will bear.”  Id. at 690 n.29.
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diations of the doctrine came in Justice Jackson’s opinion in the foreign affairs tinged 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.88 
As with localism, this brand of presidentialism has enjoyed renewed support with 
a view toward foreign affairs in particular.  White House officials were apparently 
prepared to deploy this argument in support of the Bush Administration’s authority to 
use military force against Iraq had Congress not expressly granted such authority89—a 
readiness that almost certainly means they will dust it off should Congress grow impa-
tient with the armed forces’ continued postwar presence.  The claim has also received 
varying degrees of support from established scholars not ordinarily associated with 
“new foreign affairs law” such as Phillip Trimble90 and H. Jefferson Powell.91 Most 
powerfully, it has been put forward in an important article in the Yale Law Journal by 
Saikrishna Prakash and Michael Ramsay, younger scholars who are avowedly revi-
sionist.92 
This reconstituted argument on behalf of presidential foreign affairs authority has 
served as the foundation for more specific claims.  Some scholars argue, for example, 
that the President possesses the exclusive power to terminate treaties, since that power 
is inherently executive and not expressly delegated to Congress or to the Senate.93  
Others contend that the President has broad unenumerated war powers in situations 
not involving congressional declarations of war, since the war power, too, is execu-
tive.94  Still others go even further and contend that the power of Congress to declare 
war is only the power to confirm that a state of war exists in international law and 
does not impose any restriction on the President’s inherent executive authority to 
make war.95  Even the argument that treaties are not self-executing gains support from 
this idea insofar as treaties are characterized as executive in nature and thus require 
legislative approval to enjoy domestic effect.96 
 
 88. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640-41 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 
632 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Article II which vests the ‘executive Power’ in the President defines that power 
with particularity.”).
 
 89. See Mike Allen & Juliet Eilperin, Bush Aides Say Iraq War Needs No Hill Vote; Some See Such Sup-
port as Politically Helpful, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2002, at A1. 
 
 90. PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (2002).
 
 91. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (2002); see Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. 
REV. 327, 337-38 (2002) (endorsing the Article II claim in passing). 
 92. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 10. 
 93. Id. at 324-27. 
 94. See, e.g., ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RESTORING THE RULE OF 
LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1991); Robert H. Bork, Erosion of the President’s Power in Foreign Affairs, 68 
WASH. U. L.Q. 693 (1990).
 
 95. See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, “Once More unto the Breach”: The War Powers Resolution Revisited, 21 
VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1986); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Under-
standing of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996). 
 96. John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-
Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999); Yoo, supra note 9; see also John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation 
and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1305 (2002); John C. Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851 (2001) (rely-
ing on the Vesting Clause Thesis to support broad presidential power to interpret treaties).
 
09_FLAHERTY_FMT.DOC 2/16/2005  9:35 AM 
Autumn 2004] U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 183 
In all these ways, the new foreign affairs challenge promises to reorient the field 
substantially just as the United States appears to become ever more engaged on the 
world stage in the future.  Ironically, however, much as its domestic counterpart, this 
reorientation is firmly grounded in the past. 
III 
WHY GEORGE 43 IS NOT GEORGE III  
(NOR THE CONSTITUTION, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS) 
A. Clio Gets a Passport 
The Constitution’s delphic treatment of foreign affairs authority has long forced 
interpreters to resort heavily to history to fill in the resulting gaps.  Edward Corwin’s 
great works read like historical monographs, though he himself was a political scien-
tist.97  Louis Henkin, no advocate of the past controlling the present, frequently turns 
to history to clarify foreign affairs doctrine.98  Even Justice Jackson, who in Youngs-
town famously dismissed reliance on original understanding, nonetheless constructed 
a framework in which post-ratification history would figure prominently, as Justice 
Frankfurter’s complementary opinion illustrated.99 
With the possible exception of Corwin, never has history figured more promi-
nently in foreign affairs scholarship than today.  To a significant extent, this turn to 
history has gone hand in hand with the new foreign affairs law challenge.  Many, 
though not all, revisionists ground their claims on some form of originialism, offering 
accounts of the Founding in particular that purportedly undermine the current ortho-
doxy.  Not a few defenders of prevailing doctrine have answered in kind, with specific 
accounts meant to refute the revisionists.  The back and forth has resulted in hundreds 
of law review pages dedicated to the historical background of such issues as whether 
the Constitution presumed treaties to be self-executing,100 the relationship between the 
treaty power and U.S. federalism,101 the legitimacy of congressional-executive agree-
ments,102 and the respective war powers of Congress and the President.103  There have 
 
 97. EDWARD S. CORWIN, NATIONAL SUPREMACY: TREATY POWER VS. STATE POWER (1913).
 
 98. See HENKIN, supra note 3.
 
 99. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), Jack-
son stated that, “Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern 
conditions, must be divined from material almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to inter-
pret for Pharaoh.”  The three-part framework he advocated for assessing presidential power, however, invites 
consideration of the historical practices of the political branches, such as longstanding acquiescence by Con-
gress in assertions of presidential power.  Id. at 637 (“[C]ongressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may 
sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibil-
ity.”).  Frankfurter was more explicit about looking to such practices, arguing that “a systematic, unbroken, ex-
ecutive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated 
as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”  Id. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring).
 
 100. E.g., Flaherty, supra note 78; Yoo, Public Lawmaking, supra note 96; Yoo, supra note 9. 
 101. E.g., Bradley, Treaty Power I, supra note 59; Bradley, Treaty Power II, supra note 59; Golove, supra 
note 12.
 
 102. E.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1995); 
David Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791 (1998); Peter J. Spiro Treaties, Execu-
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also been important recent articles addressing the history of foreign affairs law doc-
trine more generally.104  Recent assertions in favor of the President’s general foreign 
affairs authority have also been historically driven, whether broad, such as the lengthy 
article by Prakash and Ramsay,105 or more measured, such as Powell’s recent mono-
graph.106 
All this preoccupation with the late eighteenth century is arguably the latest mani-
festation of a more general turn to history elsewhere in constitutional law scholar-
ship.107  The current vogue of “originalism” sprang initially from the political right, 
with which it remains most commonly associated.108  Yet much originalist work in re-
cent years has issued from elsewhere along the political spectrum, even if its practitio-
ners reject the label.109  So pervasive has this perspective become that Professor Randy 
Barnett can plausibly proclaim that “[o]riginalism has not only survived the debate of 
the eighties, but it has virtually triumphed over its rivals. Originalism is now the pre-
vailing approach to constitutional interpretation.  Even more remarkably, it has pre-
vailed without anyone writing a definitive formulation of originalism or a definitive 
refutation of its critics.”110 
B. The Myth of Continuity 
As is true in the domestic realm, the new foreign affairs originalism offers a story 
of continuity and consensus.  According to this story, the Founding reflected funda-
mental principles of government that had already stood the test of time for nearly a 
century and commanded widespread assent from the American populace, so wide-
 
tive Agreements, and Constitutional Methods, 79 TEX. L. REV. 961 (2001); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and 
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
1221 (1995); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001).
 
 103. E.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543 (2002). 
 104. E.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nine-
teenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002); G. Edward White, 
The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
 
 105. Professors Prakash and Ramsey devote almost three-quarters of their lengthy case for the Vesting 
Clause thesis to eighteenth century history.  See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 10. 
 106. Professor Powell devotes a significant portion of his work to the late eighteenth century, the Washing-
ton Administration in particular.  See POWELL, supra note 91.
 
 107. See generally LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1996); G. 
Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485 (2002). 
 108. E.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990)  
(defending originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation); Edwin Meese, Speech before the American 
Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 1 (2d ed. 
1991) (same); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 
(1995) (same); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989) (same). 
 109. E.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); Lawrence Lessig; Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1365 
(1997); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 
95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995).
 
 110. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Non-Originalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613 (1999).  For a strong 
normative dissent, see Michael J. Klarman, Does the Constitution Deserve Our Fidelity: Fidelity, Indetermi-
nacy, and the Problem of Constitutional Evil, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1739 (1997).  See also Paul Brest, The 
Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Origi-
nal Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
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spread that certain tenets apparently no longer needed to be articulated.  For foreign 
affairs, one key commitment was local, democratic self-rule.  Just as this principle, 
enshrined as federalism, safeguarded the states from intrusion by the distant national 
government, so it also yielded doctrines protecting both the states and nation from still 
more distant foreign entanglements.  No less important was the Founding’s parallel 
commitment to separation of powers.  Not only was this idea as deeply held and long-
standing, it had also been fairly clearly worked out.  Among the major corollaries was 
the doctrine that foreign affairs authority was executive in nature, a belief initially 
embodied in the British Crown and later reflected in the American executive.  Change 
and confusion would come, but only later, as subsequent generations would fall prey 
to the temptations of the moment and stray from the Founders’ wisdom without ob-
taining a popular mandate through the amendment process. 
An account such as this, offering a golden age of certainty that was lost but that 
can be found again, strikes a deep chord.  Judge Bork discovered as much in setting 
the course for domestic originalism in The Tempting of America.111  In either case, the 
crucial predicate is precisely the degree to which the case for the original golden age 
is compelling.  On this score new foreign affairs originalists appear to do better than 
their domestic forebears in seeking to demonstrate just how far back and deep the 
Founding’s bedrock ideas went.  A spotlight on a few of the leading offerings will suf-
fice to show how the task typically proceeds. 
The case usually begins, appropriately enough, well before the Founding itself 
with the great constitutional thinkers of the preceding century.  Sometimes these are 
divided among the leading political theorists such as Locke and Montesquieu; interna-
tional jurists, including Grotius, Puffendorf, and Vattel; and somewhat later experts on 
the English common law, such as Blackstone.  However grouped, these figures are 
rightly claimed to have been influential in America, though at times the implication 
seems to be that this influence was all but dispositive.  More importantly, the new for-
eign affairs account asserts that these great minds indeed did think alike.  Enlighten-
ment thought and English law therefore stood united in stressing the primacy of na-
tional sentiment in foreign affairs.  One consequence was the conclusion that a treaty 
could not be binding domestically unless first approved by the national lawmaker, or-
dinarily the legislature.  Likewise, the writings of Locke, Grotius, Blackstone, and the 
rest, to varying degrees, relied on the idea of separation of powers to conclude more or 
less uniformly that the sovereign, or executive, power exclusively comprised the au-
thority to deal with foreign sovereigns through such means as sending and receiving 
ambassadors, making treaties, or making war. 
With such a firm foundation, it should come as no surprise that Americans imple-
mented these principles when they first had the chance.  That opportunity arose in 
light of the Revolution and Independence through the first state constitutions and the 
Articles of Confederation.  Taken together, these documents represented a high point 
for the principle of local self-rule.  While the Confederation Congress—itself akin to 
 
 111. See BORK, supra note 108 (lamenting modern repudiation of the founders’ original intention with re-
gard to both specific issues and a general interpretive approach). 
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no more than a “diplomatic assembly”—undertook foreign policy-making, its initia-
tives were not binding without the approval of the state legislatures, the only directly 
elected governments around.  In somewhat more complex fashion, circumstances pre-
vented the realization of executive foreign affairs authority since the country was not 
yet ready for anything more than an apparently legislative diplomatic assembly at the 
national level.  At least one scholar posits that constitutional thinkers came to terms 
with this problem by viewing Congress as executive when discharging such foreign 
affairs functions as treatymaking, and the states as legislative in having to implement 
such international obligations domestically.112  Even then, congressional inefficiency 
in conducting foreign policy merely highlighted the need for a true executive should 
there be an opportunity for reform. 
By curing such problems, the Constitution represented not so much an innovation 
responding to experience as a restoration of the established wisdom of Locke, Mon-
tesquieu, and Blackstone, which had been yet to be fully implemented.  While the new 
framework shifted power to the federal government in foreign no less than in domestic 
affairs, the price was an ongoing respect for “state sovereignty” consistent with the 
tradition of local self-government.113  It apparently followed, therefore, that treaties 
still could not preempt state law, a power that could be asserted only by an Act of 
Congress implementing a treaty.114  Even then, Congress in implementing a treaty 
gained no additional power to intrude upon matters of state regulation that it would 
otherwise have under the Constitution’s existing grants of power.115  Almost a fortiori, 
the customary law of nations did not of itself apply as federal law, nor was the author-
ity of congress to implement it clear.116  As for separation of powers, the vesting of the 
executive Power in the President under the eighteenth-century definition in the Consti-
tution meant the foreign affairs authority was subject to the few express limitations 
that the document set out.117 
The early national government would confirm the established wisdom that the 
Constitution applied.  This meant, among other things, deliberate and deliberative re-
fusal to undertake binding foreign affairs commitments that did not fully accord with 
the principle of democratic self-government.  Congress therefore insisted on imple-
menting treaties that otherwise may have been deemed self-executing and passed no 
law intruding upon state authority or sovereignty relying upon a treaty alone.118  At-
torneys for the federal government, no less, have even put forward the argument that 
the first Congress may have expressly authorized federal court jurisdiction of suits un-
 
 112. Yoo, supra note 9, at 2009-13. 
 113. Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (“As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution es-
tablishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government.”). 
 114. Yoo, supra note 9, 1960-62. 
 115. Bradley, Treaty Power I, supra note 59, at 410-18. 
 116. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Liti-
gation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 331-32 (1997); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and 
Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1641-52 (1997). 
 117. Prakash & Ramsay, supra note 10, at 265-354. 
 118. Bradley, Treaty Power I, supra note 59, at 418-22. 
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der the law of nations, but consciously declined to provide for a cause of action.119  
For its part, the Washington Administration also made sure that the Executive con-
trolled foreign affairs.  With a practical and theoretical assist from Alexander Hamil-
ton in particular, the first President prevailed in securing sole control over manage-
ment of the diplomatic corps, communications with foreign sovereigns, reception of 
foreign emissaries, termination of treaties, and proclamation of neutrality.120 
C. The Unbearable Thinness of Founding Foreign Affairs 
The new foreign affairs history invites strict scrutiny if only because of the weight 
new foreign affairs law advocates would place upon it.  As almost every modern the-
ory of constitutional interpretation reserves a place for history, each theory that does 
so justifies the move on the ground that the past can augment the authority of a legal 
argument.121  Even theories that merely look to a Madison or Hamilton as great think-
ers in the same sense as Locke or Rawls often cannot help emphasizing that the Foun-
ders’ great thoughts relate to a particular system of government—ours—that they 
helped bring about as a historical matter, thus privileging their ideas. Theories that 
emphasize historical custom or tradition rely on the past somewhat more heavily by 
positing that post-ratification practice, a historical span that is now into its third cen-
tury, can help settle doctrine when purely legal tools cannot.  Most steadfast in their 
backward gaze, originalists of various stripes stipulate that the past fact of an under-
standing or intention underlying a text at a particular time and place fixes its modern 
legal meaning.  From all these approaches it follows that, in turning to another field to 
seek additional authority, the standards that make conclusions in that field authorita-
tive should be respected.  If not, then the very purpose for seeking the external author-
ity is defeated.  For similar reasons, it follows that these standards must apply with the 
greatest rigor to originalist accounts, since these are where the legal stakes are high-
est.122  As noted, originalism serves as the rationale for much of the foreign affairs re-
visionism that has recently been put forward.123 
Ordinarily, a historical critique would begin with issues of method,124 and here the 
story of continuity presents an interesting mix of predictable lawyerly problems with 
certain apparent historical strengths.  On the negative side, much of the work in this 
area is highly selective.  Ellipses appear at critical moments in key quotations.125  Parts 
of quotations are paraphrased even when ambiguous.126  These tendencies in turn 
shade into disregard of historical depth and complexity.  Contrary voices are absent 
notwithstanding descriptions of hard-fought partisan or ideological battles.  Bold as-
 
 119. Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 8-10, John Doe I v. UNOCAL Corp. 2002 
Cal. Daily Op. Service 9585 (9th Cir., 2003). 
 120. Prakash & Ramsay, supra note 10, at 295-354. 
 121. See supra text accompanying notes 108-109. 
 122. Flaherty, supra note 11, at 549-52. 
 123. See supra Part II B. 
 124. Flaherty, supra note 11, at 552-54. 
 125. E.g., Yoo, supra note 9, at 2052-54. 
 126. E.g., Prakash & Ramsay, supra note 10, at 265-72. 
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sertions about consensus views of the Founders result.127  All the more odd, therefore, 
that this body of work displays an admirable concern with those strictures that counsel 
adopting a broad historical context.128  Unlike typical law office history, or even his-
tory “lite,” the accounts offered here do not simply offer snapshots of what a given 
constitutional text meant at the Federal Convention or the ratification debates.  To the 
contrary, the work in this area typically begins with the views of seventeenth and 
eighteenth century constitutional thinkers, then takes into account British practice, 
discusses the Revolution and Critical Period, and only then takes up the Federal Con-
vention and debates, finally providing detailed descriptions of constitutional contro-
versies in the early Republic to confirm all that has gone before.  The nature of this 
account may in part explain why it grades so well on context.129  If the story is one of 
continuity, as is it according to the new foreign affairs school, repeated confirmations 
of the basic historical roots make the claim that much stronger. 
The mixed assessment of this new foreign affairs history begins to look more 
problematic once substantive considerations are brought into play.  These considera-
tions are less frequently proffered, but are vital in the context of the Founding.  Histo-
rians working in a given field might not offer much more than a wealth of competing 
interpretations, but at times they might collectively agree on a general broad narrative 
notwithstanding their disputes of important particulars.  From such general agreement 
arises at least a presumption that specific questions will be resolved in a way that is 
consistent with the overall framework.  None of this is to say that historical presump-
tions cannot be rebutted with specific evidence.  One reason why historians tend to fo-
cus on method rather than substance when critiquing other historians is precisely be-
cause knocking a dominant paradigm off its pedestal, whether with newly discovered 
evidence or more rigorous analysis, is to a large degree what the profession is about.  
It is unlikely, however, that lawyers or even legal scholars keen to carry an argument 
will have the time or resources that historians enjoy to smash the prevailing historical 
icons themselves.  Assertions inconsistent with a generally accepted historical narra-
tive should be taken seriously but skeptically.130 
As it happens, the Founding is one of those periods that has generated a broad ac-
count that has been widely accepted among historians over the past several decades.  
Chief among its architects are such ideological historians as Edmund S. Morgan, Ber-
nard Bailyn, and Gordon Wood; constitutional experts including John Phillip Reid and 
Barbara Black; and subsequent scholars like Jack Rakove.131  Recent historical criti-
cism of earlier originalist efforts has apparently prompted successors, including new 
 
 127. With the exception of Madison’s writing as “Helvidius,” Professors Prakash and Ramsay focus almost 
exclusively on the views of those in the Washington Administration, rather than anyone in Congress, for con-
temporary views on executive power in foreign affairs.  See id. at 295-354. 
 128. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659,  678-91 (1987); Flaherty, supra note 
11, at 552-53. 
 129. See supra text accompanying notes 111-119. 
 130. See Flaherty, supra note 11, at 554-55.  For a somewhat more extended discussion of this point that 
considers various objections, see Martin S. Flaherty, The Practice of Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1565, 1572-
79 (1997). 
 131. Flaherty, supra note 11, at 536-49. 
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foreign affairs authors, to include liberal citations to many of these leading names.132  
What matters, however, is recognition not of their works but of what their works as-
sert.  Suffice it to say for present purposes that the dominant narrative these and other 
historians have set out diverges from the revisionist challenge in two fundamental re-
spects.  First, the prevailing narrative emphasizes the Founding’s era constitutional in-
novations as opposed to continuity with preceding periods.  Second, the mainstream 
account stresses the open-endedness of the innovations that came to be adopted, 
mainly as a result of the lack of consensus, or even forethought, about large details.  
This point stands in stark contrast to the revisionist effort to portray the constitutional 
choices of the time as the thoroughly established fruits of consensus. 
That said, the leading historians of the Founding—much like the Americans they 
chronicle—have not looked at foreign affairs developments as closely as those on the 
domestic front.  But even here the news is not necessarily good for the revisionist 
cause.  The comparative lack of attention that Americans devoted to foreign affairs 
doctrine provides every reason to believe that the solutions they advanced were even 
less fixed and definite than in domestic law.  Moreover, what work that does exist 
suggests substantive trends not especially congenial to the new foreign affairs account.  
For separation of powers, while the Constitution certainly represented a shift in power 
toward the executive (and judiciary), that shift resulted in unprecedented allocations of 
power—both domestic and foreign—with ample power remaining, or even shifting to 
the other branches.  In a somewhat more straightforward fashion, the clear transfer of 
power away from the states in the Constitution went hand-in-hand with greater ac-
commodation of international law within the domestic legal order. 
This very different narrative also begins prior to the Revolution.  On this account, 
Americans entered the second half of the eighteenth century not already having all 
they needed to learn from Locke and Montesquieu, but instead committed to the dis-
tinct English “Whig” or “mixed” constitution.133  Among other things, this constitution 
juxtaposed classical forms of government associated with different orders of society—
monarchy, aristocracy, democracy—rather than divided authority according to func-
tion as separation of powers commanded.  It was to defend the English Constitution 
that Americans paradoxically undertook their resistance to Britain’s imperial asser-
tions of power.134  It was also this constitutional understanding that Americans would 
ultimately have to reject.  Looking ahead, this initial commitment to the English Con-
stitution meant that Americans would have to experiment with different ways to allo-
cate power within government as well as to arrange power between a central govern-
ment and subordinate parts in ways that would endure longer than the British Empire 
in North America.135 
 
 132. Professor Yoo’s work, for example, typically relies on a wide-ranging array of primary and secondary 
sources.  See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 9, at 1982-2091. 
 133. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 70 (2d ed. 1992). 
 134. Id. at 70-78. 
 135. See JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE EXTENDED 
POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES, 1607-1788, 129-211 (1986). 
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Independence initiated the process of experimentation.  At the state level, which 
commanded by far the most energy and effort, the former colonists generally adopted 
frameworks characterized as republican.  In large part this result still reflected older 
constitutional understandings.  Since few Americans believed that either monarchy or 
aristocracy was feasible on their side of the Atlantic, only democracy, expressed as 
representative republics, remained a possibility.  In part, too, the republican constitu-
tions also represented a turn toward separation of powers analysis with which they 
were familiar but which had never been well integrated with the mixed government 
paradigm.  The typical allocation of power in these constitutions, however, signalled 
an understanding of separation of powers far different from what would develop.  In 
broad terms, the early state constitutions concentrated substantial power in the legisla-
tures, leaving weak and dependent executives and judiciaries.136  Meanwhile, on the 
national level, the Articles of Confederation formally centered all power in the Con-
gress yet did not include any authority to compel either individuals or the states to 
abide by the laws it enacted or the treaties it ratified.137 
The resulting state of affairs initiated still further experimentation.  At home, the 
republican state assemblies forced a fundamental rethinking of government as they 
violated basic rights and so facilitated the people’s tyrannizing themselves, a result 
thought to be a contradiction in terms.  Confronting this problem led to novel applica-
tions of separation of powers with a net shift in authority to the executive and judici-
ary.  Even then, many of the later constitutions that applied these ideas shared this 
commitment generally (what it meant in detail varied significantly from one to an-
other) with the federal Constitution, and ironically with the conceptions of modern 
separation of powers originalists.138  With the federal Constitution also came a radi-
cally innovative reordering of power between the states and the national government, 
the consequence of state irresponsibility in both national and international affairs.  As 
with separation of powers, ideas about federalism saw a clear shift, this time to the na-
tional government, which now could act upon individuals and which was now com-
prised of directly elected representatives.  Yet, as with separation of powers, many 
substantial “details” remained to be worked out over time.139  Given this prologue, the 
Washington Administration and the early Congresses worked out deferred or disputed 
matters as much as they confirmed what had been resolved. 
All this presents obvious problems for the revisionist account.  The dramatic dis-
continuities that Americans experienced in moving from the English Constitution to 
the republican state constitutions to the federal Constitution strain the plausibility of a 
highly continuous narrative.  In part for this reason, some of the leading accounts ex-
tolling executive authority, while rich in detail about eighteenth century political 
thought and the practices of the Washington Administration, are curiously sparse with 
regard to the Critical Period, the Convention, and ratification.  This feature is particu-
larly ironic, given the originalist premises from which these accounts proceed.  A 
 
 136. Martin S. Flaherty, Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1755-76 (1996). 
 137. Flaherty, supra note 78, at 2118. 
 138. For an effort of my own to make this point, see Flaherty, supra note 136. 
 139. For a parallel effort, this time no more than a sketch, see Martin S. Flaherty, supra note 16. 
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broadly similar point obtains with regard to federalism as the bulwark against interna-
tionalism.  Here, prominent efforts accord more consistent coverage throughout the 
entire relevant period, including the key chapters of framing and ratification.  Yet the 
idea that, for example, early notions about domestic implementation of international 
law—even if accurate—simply carried through a time of revolution, experiment, reac-
tion, and further innovation is prima facie dubious.  In this instance the point is rein-
forced, given that one aspect of the relevant reaction was local democratic frustration 
of treaty commitments, with a resulting high cost to fledgling U.S. standing overseas. 
Revisionist accounts must also overcome historians’ emphasis and how much the 
founding generation left unresolved.  As Rakove has explained, the Constitution pa-
pered over, sidestepped, or simply failed to foresee many issues large and small.140  
Anything more would have been surprising given the enormous, often innovative, so-
lutions for which the Founders did secure agreement.  Rakove continues that, inten-
tional or not, the net effect was to leave to the institutions that the Constitution did es-
tablish the task of resolving many important matters over time rather than with 
reference to an original consensus that never existed.141  According to the revisionist 
accounts, however, the Founding generation did achieve consensus on matters such as 
treaty termination and removal of executive officers.  With reference to terms such as 
executive or legislative, moreover, so complete was this consensus that the Founders 
saw no need to define these terms in detail.  By incorporating these general terms in 
the Constitution, it is argued, the founding generation fixed their meaning thoroughly 
and in detail—or, more accurately, confirmed the achievements of previous thinkers 
who had already done so. 
It is conceivable, of course, that the story of continuity and consensus is correct.  
Perhaps executive authority in foreign affairs is an exception to the general narrative, 
an exception that if multiplied might force rethinking of the general narrative itself.  
But precisely because there is a Founding narrative stressing change and uncertainty, a 
substantial burden falls upon those whose more specific accounts do not accord.  To 
date, that burden has not been met. 
IV 
CONCLUSION: MARCHING FORWARD INTO THE FUTURE 
A prominent historian of a previous generation once characterized the supporters 
of Andrew Jackson as for good or ill “marching backward into the future.”142  That 
image broadly applies to those who urge, also for good or ill, material reliance on his-
 
 140. As Jack Rakove put it: 
Only the experience of government under the Constitution could finally dispel Anti-Federalist visions 
of an imminent descent into tyranny.  The original interpretations of 1787-88 could yield nothing 
more than reasonable explanations and predictions of what the Constitution would mean.  If events 
proved them false, or when ambiguities demanded resolution, intervening experience would provide 
the foundation for determining the course that the interpretation or revision of the Constitution should 
then take. 
RAKOVE, supra note 14, at 160. 
 141. See id. at 159-60; see also Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611 (1999). 
 142. See MARVIN MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BELIEF 229-33 (2d ed. 1960). 
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tory to fashion constitutional doctrine to address modern controversies.  It applies 
even more appropriately to that significant portion of  revisionist foreign affairs schol-
arship that would turn to the past to fix a doctrine with regard to the numerous im-
pending issues that the U.S. role abroad and the growing reach of international law 
will present. 
Those committed to this quest should be prepared for ironic results.  Contrary to 
the revisionist account put forward by many legal scholars, historians have for some 
time stressed the extent to which early American constitutionalism changed radically 
in light of shifting circumstances and often achieved general agreement at only the 
most general levels, leaving sweeping details to be worked out over time.  Nowhere, 
moreover, do these themes appear to resonate more strongly than regarding foreign 
affairs, to which Americans were comparative newcomers.  This is not to say that 
even here, the Founding could not command consensus at a level sufficiently precise 
to provide specific guidance in modern controversies.  Such instances, however, do 
not necessarily support either the localism or presidentialism that foreign affairs revi-
sionists posit.  The principle that treaties would be self-executing is one instance.143  
The doctrine that the President cannot ordinarily commit the nation to armed conflict 
without the approval of Congress is another.144  Conversely, translating such Founding 
principles to a very different nation and world two centuries later presents more than a 
few problems of modern application in their own right.145  The main point remains, 
however, remains that the Founding’s discontinuities and disagreements will leave no 
alternative other than marching forward into the future. 
To that extent, foreign affairs history paradoxically will often point to the ap-
proach put forward in what is sometimes read as among the Supreme Court’s most 
anti-historical opinions.  In Youngstown, Justice Jackson famously dismissed reliance 
on the Founding, declaring: 
Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern 
conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was 
called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.  A century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly 
quotations yields no net result, but only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected 
sources on either side of any question. . . .  They largely cancel each other.146 
In place of the Founding, Jackson among other things turned to the Constitution’s text 
and structure.  But since “[t]hat instrument must be understood as an Eighteenth-
Century sketch of a government hoped for, rather than the Government that is,”147 
Jackson’s opinion also surveyed how the three branches of government had actually 
filled in the sketch in ways that invited political science and even international rela-
tions and comparative analysis.148  Jackson’s celebrated opinion, in short, assigns an 
 
 143. See Flaherty, supra note 78 passim. 
 144. See William Michael Treanor, Fame, The Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. 
REV. 695 (1997).  But see Yoo, supra note 95. 
 145. Compare Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993) (advocating the trans-
lation of past constitutional principles to changed contexts) with Klarman, Anti-Fidelity, supra note 110 (ex-
pressing skepticism). 
 146. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 147. Id. at 653. 
 148. See id. at 647-53. 
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ambiguity to the Founding that leading historical accounts suggest is accurate, espe-
cially in foreign affairs, then points to more present and forward-looking sources of 
constitutional meaning to continue the process of fashioning specific constitutional 
answers.  Striking in this regard, for example, is Jackson’s analysis of emergency 
powers in other jurisdictions to assist considering the question in U.S. law, an exercise 
that in certain regards anticipates the recent exercises of Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer.149 
Then again, Jackson could not avoid the past altogether.  As much as it rejected 
dispositive reliance on the Founding, his concurrence nonetheless made clear that tak-
ing into account how the branches of government had presumptively resolved certain 
issues by definition required a knowledge of constitutional history as it developed, 
once the hopeful sketch was in place.  This source has been dubbed constitutional 
“tradition” or “custom” by various scholars,150  Jackson did this in Youngstown itself 
when he concluded, as Justice Frankfurter’s foldout table made clear, that over the 
decades Congress had not left executive seizure of private property an open question 
but had already addressed it, further relegating President Truman’s action to Jackson’s 
“low ebb” category.151  So long as this source remains in play, the need to guard 
against historical myths, in foreign affairs or otherwise, will remain an imperative. 
 
 
 149. Id. at 651-52. 
 150. On the judicial side, a principle expositor of tradition as a source of constitutional meaning is the sec-
ond Justice Harlan.  Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-45 (1961).  On the academic side, a leading exponent is 
Larry Kramer.  Larry D. Kramer, Fidelity to History—and Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627, 1631-41 
(1997). 
 151. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 639 & n.8 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
